Retire Mechanical engineer. Student at California State university Channel Island studiyingAbout Me

My photo

January 1, 2017

US-Turkish Relations After the Failed Coup” By Behcet Kaya



“US-Turkish Relations After the Failed Coup”
By
Behcet Kaya
The following is an empirical study delving into the relationship of two NATO countries, the US and Turkey, which have been allies for over six decades. This research paper will evaluate the impact of the July 15, 2016 failed Turkish coup on each nation, what led to the coup, where each nation stands now, why the partnership should be maintained and obstacles to the goal of maintaining the partnership.
Turkey and the US have remained indispensable allies since 1952, although, through the years there have always been conflicts and disagreements between the parties. Two major recent events include that in 2003 Turkey would not allow the passage of 80,000 US troops through its land for the invasion of Iraq. In addition, the CIA fabricated false evidence against the Turkish military by planning to overthrow the democratically elected government.

 The mastermind, Henri J. Barkey, a CIA field officer, bragged about it one of his speeches in Utah, as to how the CIA-backed Gulen movement and the Erdogan government toppled the Turkish military because of their interfering in Turkish politics. It is a common belief held by the Turks that the CIA orchestrated the coup on July 15, 2016 to overthrow Erdogan.
The Turkish papers reported that retired ISAF General John F. Campbell was the chief mastermind behind the coup. General Campbell paid a visit to Turkey a week before the coup and conducted meetings in several different cities where airbases are located. On the night of the coup, General Campbell, through the CIA, transferred $2 million from the Nigerian UBA Bank to various Turkish banks. The money was used to pay the Gulen backed officers in the army. Two briefcases of money in US dollars was later confiscated and proved the transfer of money. This news was reported by The Wall Street Journal. Also, former Carter National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brezezinski openly criticized the CIA for mishandling the Turkish affairs (31.08.2016. Author: F. William Engdahl Top USA National Security Officials Admit Turkey Coup).
The impact of the failed Turkish coup was the final blow to the bilateral relationship between Turkey and the US. That is not to say that the CIA’s orchestrating the coup was the only thing responsible for the divergence of the bilateral relationship. There are other major events causing this divergence. The multipolar changing world is one of them. At present, the US is still the major power both economically and militarily. However, the US is no longer the boss. Other powers must be taken into a consideration, such as the soft powers of India, Brazil and Turkey. The China, Russia, Iran alliance is the other. 

Research Question and Hypothesis:
Research question: “US-Turkish Relations After the Coup.” The hypothesis will show how each country’s leaders have made grave mistakes. Also, that a contributing factor is the differences in each country’s culture and how these cultural differences have played a major part in the problem. This fact can be verified by the studies done by (Grove A., & Carter, N. (1999). In the article of “Not all Blarney is Cast in Stone: International Culture Conflict in Northern Ireland.” Dr. Grove and Dr. Carter indicate that all of communal conflicts are over ideas of national identity. The national identity is bound to cultural identity, therefore foreign policy decision makers must consider the importance of cultural factors in their consideration of how people will define the “self.” In other words, how collective culture effects foreign policy (Grove A., & Carter, N. (1999).
This explanation of culture fits perfectly into US-Turkish bilateral relationship. In his newspaper interview, former Ambassador James Jeffrey to Turkey 2008 to 2010 explains: “the majority of Turks believe that the two most notorious enemies of the Turks are Graham F. Fuller, who served in the CIA, and Henri J. Barkey.” But, if you ask any American who these people are, they would not know. So, the Turks exaggerate conspiracy theories in their minds. Consider the Americans who, in their constitution, believe that democracy’s important components are human rights, freedom of speech, and minority rights. Turkey has all of these, but, in the minds of Turks, they don’t think jailing journalists is wrong, considering that journalists are involved in certain crimes against the state. But Americans see that as an oppression against media (Hurriyet daily 2016). So the cultural characteristics of each nation see differently in the foreign policy matters.
When considering variables, both dependent and independent, it is worthy to note that both can be defined. In a broader sense, the dependent variable is Middle East stability. In a narrower sense, the dependent variable is ultimately to destabilize Turkey (Turkish public opinion). In destabilizing Turkey, the entire area becomes destabilized. The dependent variables to be tested include the following: the US support of Turkey and Israel to better maintain stability in the Middle East. But support for Turkey is not just strategic support, but also economic support in opening American markets to Turkish goods.
The independent variable is the US supporting the YPG, which is essential for US policy makers, because the YPG is the only US ally fighting against ISIS. The US can control the independent variable. However, at present, the US continues support of YPG in hindering this relationship. The other side of the coin is the opposing independent variable of  the YPG and the PKK who formed an alliance long before ISIS came to be. Right now, Turkey and the US are playing a cat and mouse game. Statement of how each variable will be operationalized and measured: US supports the YPG and for Turkey, the YPG is a terrorist organization.
The qualitative case study method will be used due to the amount of journal articles that have been written on the subject; there is no need to do a new survey. Every year since the beginning of the partnership in 1952, public opinion and data have been collected on both countries. Only scholarly journal articles will be used up to the date that the coup took place, July 15, 2016, and thereafter newspaper articles and some foreign affairs journals will be used. The journals on the failed coup are not peer-reviewed due to time limitations.
The US-Turkish partnership has been studied by numerous scholars from both nations, as well as international academia. Papers collected are not similar, but rather give opposite scenarios. US and Turkish public opinion will also be included, as well as each nation’s perception of each other. The main goal of this paper is to design the research methods to be used and study common perceptions in order to propose an accurate evaluation of the situation. The research question to be explored is, “US-Turkish Relations After the Failed Coup.”

A brief history of the partnership and major disagreements:
One can argue that had it not been the Soviet Union’s threat to Turkey after WWII, claiming territory from eastern Turkey and desiring to have a military bases on the Turkish straights, the US-Turkish alliance would never have come to fruition. America had to defend Turkey due to its containment policy towards the USSR and Turkey’s bandwagoning was to protect its territory. This is evident from the Nikita Khrushchev’s memoir, “Stalin succeeded in frightening the Turks right into opening arms of Americans” (Sayari, 2013, p 135). 
During the Cold War period there was a great deal of military cooperation between the two countries. For example, the Truman Doctrine in 1947, and Turkey’s sending 4500 troops to the Korean War effort played a decisive role in admitting Turkey into NATO. Turkish foreign policy followed the guidelines set by the US and NATO on major regional and global issues. This relationship remained intact until the eruption of Cyprus and feuding over the Aegean between Greece and Turkey (Sayari, 2013. p 135). 
However, in the beginning of the partnership in 1952, the US did not want to accept Turkey into the NATO alliance, but Briton’s Churchill persuaded the US to accept Turkey into NATO. Remember Churchill’s famous statement, “I would rather have Turks with us than against us.” The bilateral relations between Turkey and the US have been mostly strained (Cakmak and Guneysu, 2013).
In 1964, when the Turks bombed Cyprus to protect Turkish citizens from the killing spree orchestrated by Greek Cypriots, President Johnson sent a very rude letter to Turkish Prime minister Inonu. Turkey was traumatized by Johnson’s letter. In that letter addressed to the Turkish prime minister in 1964, Johnson made it clear that unilateral intervention by Turkey in Cyprus would not be a good idea even if its interests were at stake. But the Turks worried that the US would not guarantee the enforcement of collective action by NATO in case of a Soviet attack against Turkey as reflected in the following excerpt from the said letter: “I hope you will understand that NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.”
This was not only the case where the US and Turkey have had disagreements. Several other ongoing issues include the Armenian genocide allegations, and human rights abuses in Turkey. During the Nixon years, there were the opium wars, which kept Turkey distant from the US. In 1974, the Cyprus invasion occurred when the Greek military junta wanted to annex Cyprus to Greece and overthrow Makarios (Warner, 2009).
Then there was the embargo of the sale of US weapons. During the1980 coup, the CIA meddled in Turkish politics. Then there was the US sinking of a Turkish frigate during NATO exercises when US missiles hit a Turkish ship, killing five (Schmitt1992).
“Turkey/US: Strained Relations,” Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service. (Mar 25, 1987). In this piece, the author examines the relationship between Turkey and the US and identifies the Turkish disappointment of the US foreign policies toward Turkey. Turkey was the most important strategic partner of the US during the Cold War period, but it was an unfair partnership due to the fact that Turkey did not benefit economically from US help as other countries had. Anytime economic or military aid was intended to be given to Turkey, the powerful Armenian lobby in the US opposed it. This has worked in favor of the US. In other words, the Armenian diaspora is the ace card for the US. This has resulted in Turkish mistrust of US policies (Oxford Analytica 1987). The author emphasizes the fact that Turkey has no alternative to its membership of NATO. This belief this is a wrong assumption because Turkey is beginning to form memberships with other Turkic nations; a very similar membership as NATO, not just military cooperation but also economic partnerships (Oxford Analytica 1987).
The end of the Cold War opened a new chapter in the bilateral relations; the US did not need Turkey anymore as a remote outpost and military ally, and Turkey was looking for integration with the EU rather than strengthening an alliance with the US (Cakmak and Guneysu 2013).
The strained relationship and growing mistrust between the two countries heightened when the US first invaded Iraq in 1990, and has continued with volatility and uncertainty during the first decade of the 21st century. High on the list was an incident in 1992  during the NATO exercises on Aegean Sea, when US forces shot at and sunk a Turkish frigate (Howard and Goldberg (2003). theguardian).
During 1990’s Washington and Ankara had disagreements over Iran and Iraq through the dual containment’s policy which Ankara fiercely opposed (Sayari.2013, p 130). It must be taken into consideration that these two countries borders with Turkey, therefore Turkey can’t just isolate these countries due to long term neighborly relationship and centuries of trades with its neighbors. 

During the Clinton administration, President Clinton and Turkish leader Turgut Ozal, tried to revive bilateral cooperation. The Bush administration (2000-08) paid little attention to Turkey, not only that, but Turkish-US relations worsened during the second Gulf war (Cakmak and Guneysu, 2013). The causes of the volatile Turkish-US bilateral relationship also include regional security problems, the decline of American power and the inclination toward a multipolar world, and transformation of Turkish domestic politics; all of which are primarily responsible for the emergence of new direction in the bilateral ties between the two countries (Sayari, 2013. p 130). The not so desirable relationship between Ankara and Washington during the Bush administration did improve during the first two years of Obama administration took over. However, the strained bilateral relationship over Iraq war largely remain intact.
While public and major social actors are digesting the new alignment with the US-led political agenda in Turkey, the US has not extended full support to Turkey (Cakmak and Guneysu 2013). The bilateral relations have always been potentially, and even inherently, problematic (Cakmak and Guneysu 2013). 
Albeit for the above mentioned issues, for more than six decades there has been a relatively good relationship between Turkey and US. It has been central to advancing US interests in the Middle East. After the Iraq war and the management of its aftermath severely strained this relationship. The US -Turkish security dilemma perception and interests are not as convergent as they once were (Ahmad, 16).
The Obama administration moment arrived, raising hopes that the US and Turkey would have the opportunity to define a framework of political action that would be beneficial for both countries, but the developments so far have proved the optimists wrong. When Obama was elected as president in 2008, there were huge expectations that Turkish-American relations would improve during Obama’s term. Obama’s visit to Turkey raised hopes for further cooperation because of common interests and visions of Turkey and the US, especially in strategic matters particularly those relevant to the Middle East. This expectation has gone unfulfilled due to mutual mistakes that could have been avoided if the two NATO allies, the US and Turkey had paid greater attention to regional developments. Events such as Syrian war got in the way; the Syrian war that could have been handled differently (Cakmak and Guneysu 2013).
Bilateral relations between Turkey and the US have unexpectedly deteriorated after the first two years of Obama’s presidency due to: Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and its changing policy towards Israel. Turkish-American relations have been strained since Turkey’s constructive approach to the Iranian nuclear issue; while in the same time period Turkey experienced an unexpected crisis with Israel, ignited by the murderous assault of the Israeli defense forces against a Turkish vessel carrying humanitarian cargo to Gaza in high seas.
Turkey’s strong response to the Israeli aggression irritated the US administration, and in retaliation, the US voted against a draft resolution deliberated at the UN Human Right Council accusing Israel of violating international humanitarian law and human rights law (Cakmak and Guneysu 2013). Here Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoglu had made the unnecessary mistake as he concluded that after the Iranian nuclear deal there was no further sanctions needed. If the sanctions failed, then Turkey would have been blamed, another mistake on the Turkish side.
On the other hand, the US administration ignored Turkey and Brazil’s diplomatic efforts and furthermore, the US administration championed a resolution imposing bitter sanctions against Iran and undermined Turkey’s efforts in mediation role in the regional issues (UN 2010). In retaliation, in an attempt to consolidate its overall stance and back its position in Iranian nuclear issues, Turkey voted against the draft proposal at the UN Security Council meeting that convened to adapt a resolution against Iran. Neither the US nor other Council members expected Turkey’s no vote. This enraged the US administration. Finally, Turkey took the first step to make things better with the US to explain the official position of Turkey and underlining that it was not moving away from and parting ways with the West (Reinl, 2010).
Most recent problems between the two allies include the 2011 incident when the US took eleven Turkish Special Forces in Iraq hostage by Colonel Petraeus (now General). Also, is Turkey’s policy toward Iran’s nuclear development program (Sayari.2013). The AKP government’s close ties with the radical and anti-American actors in the Middle East as well as the deterioration of the Israeli-Turkish relations have also contributed to the strain in the bilateral relations. This tension was loosened by Turkey’s decision to host NATO’s radar missile shield system in 2011(Sayari, 2013. p 130).
In addition, the once good relationship between Obama and Erdogan has also been greatly strained over Syria, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and Gulen’s presence in Pennsylvania. These factors have greatly deepened the Turkish public and Erdogan’s doubts of America’s true intentions in the Middle East and his strong beliefs that Turkey’s problems are made by outsiders; America and Jews. Erdogan’s dissatisfaction with Obama over Gulen echoes Khomeini’s fight with Carter over the Shah. The fight over Gulen has begun and there is no indication that US is going to hand over Gulen to Turkey. There are implications that Gulen and the CIA goes back over 20 years. If America is to turn Gulen over Turkey, he will name all CIA field agents garnered in Gulen schools all over the world (Melhem, 2016).

A brief history of Turkey’s foreign policy:
During WWII, Turkey remained neutral. Only when the Nazi government was defeated by the allies, did Turkey declare war on Germany. One reason for that was that Turkey has always stood with Germany. The other reason was that Hitler was persuaded by one of his confidants, Franz Joseph Hermann Michael Maria von Papen zu Köningen, a German nobleman who was also the German ambassador to Turkey from 1939 to 1944 (Franz von Papen 2016). During WWII, Von Papen openly argued that Germany should not invade Turkey in order to get to Persian and Middle Eastern oil, but rather should go around it; due to the fact that Turkey had no roads and the countryside was rugged mountainous terrain history (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition, 1).  
After WWII, Turkish foreign policy continued its “Peace at home peace in the world,” (Ataturk’s famous statement). This meant that Turkey followed a foreign policy since the founding of the Republic that included, “do not become involved in any part of the Middle East, especially with Islamic countries, if there is a problem.” Therefore, Turkey, under the umbrella of NATO during the Cold War, did not have any involvement in the affairs of the Middle East. This was also dictated by the heavy Kemalist elite influence and the Turkish Armed Forces, which has been the Kemalist strategy since WWII. After the end of the Cold War, Turkey began a move in the direction of autonomy and public opinion, but did not drift away from a Western alliance (my opinion and knowledge based as I lived through this in my early years, 2016).
This is due to several factors: After the USSR’s demise, the foreign policy makers in Turkey felt that the major superpower, the US, would no longer protect Turkey, and neither would NATO. While continuing to stay in NATO, Turkey began to look for an alternative alliances (my opinion and knowledge based as I lived through this in my early years, 2016).
One of Turkey’s foreign policy imperatives was to join the EU. When that did not materialize, its foreign policy imperatives were to move away from the West. There was also domestic and public opinion influence on the foreign policy. When foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu came on board, foreign policy appeared to be totally independent. Professor Davutoglu, in his prize winning book, “The Diplomatic Depth,” encouraged Prime Minister Erdogan to go along with the new foreign policy. But big mistakes were made in following this pro-Ottoman policy. The West and the US have ridiculed this policy and Davutoglu’s zero problems with Turkey’s neighbors turned into exactly opposite scenario. 
Turkey’s response to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001 was positive. The Turkish government strongly condemned the attack and joined the American led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Moreover, Turkish public opinion about the US appeared improved in 2002, but shattered in 2003 during war in Iraq. As a result, Turkish American alliance turned into a troubled relationship until 2011 (Sayari.2013, p130).
Institutional Changes: Prior to the AKP government, Turkish foreign policy makers were the state elites who were career military and civilian bureaucrats, dominated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and governing elites who tended to follow more traditional values of Turkish society, including Kemalizm, Islamism, and Turkish nationalism. The governing elites were corrupt, scandalous, and unstable coalitions. The public trusted career military elites more than the governing elites. In addition the constitutional courts and the presidency have checked the power of any parliamentary majority to uphold the secular values (Iltebir, 2015).
The relationship between governing elite and the state became less imbalanced when AKP came to power in 2002. It should be noted that the current president, Erdogan, was brought to power with the help of Jewish lobbies in US. Newspaper articles will be provided as proof that US ambassadors to Turkey, Abramawitch and Alderman, helped put Erdogan in power. Erdogan’s party achieved two-thirds majority.
This ensuing stability allowed AKP to pass the constitutional reforms that the military had dominated and was curtailing. AKP majority expanded the civil rights of its citizens and minorities, and instituted economic reforms to meet with the European criteria for membership. So, the military lost its privileged role in foreign affairs. At the same time, the more conservative, religious, and nationalist elite, who questioned secularism in Turkey, replaced the secular elite and moved towards Ottoman past (Ilbetir 2015).
During 2003, when the US wanted to deploy its troops to Northern Iraq through Turkey, the AKP government approved allowing foreign troops on its soil, but the Turkish parliament blocked the US troop passage on its territory. When the Turkish parliament voted against allowing the 80,000 troops to travel through Turkish soil to invade Iraq, Colonel Petreaus, in retaliation and without orders, captured a Turkish Special Forces unit of eleven men in their domicile, by putting hoods on their heads Rambo style on the Fourth of July, 2003. This action was quite offensive the Turkish people (Howard, Suzanne, Goldberg 2003, theguardian).
In addition, a frustrated US (CIA) made the decision interfere in Turkish internal politics to help Erdogan to free the influence of the Turkish Armed Forces’ power over the political parties. Hence, 247 military officers and generals were imprisoned for interfering and influencing the decisions of parliament (TBMM).
According to this author’s (Elnigar Iltebir Phd. 2015) study, he discusses Turkey’s new foreign policy orientation, and whether is it a threat to the West? This article was written before  the failed coup in July 2016, which has now put Turkish foreign policy in the neighboring region totally independent of US, thus abandoning the western alliance of the US and the EU. It also questions Turkey’s commitment to the strategic partnership.
Numerous case studies on Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East and Eurasian regions have been done to answer the question of whether the recent changes in Turkish foreign policy represents a fundamental change in direction of the country away from the Western alliance. It also examined the dominant factors driving Turkish foreign policy during last decade. The study concludes that Turkey’s foreign policy transformation in the last decade represents a significant change in the direction of autonomy, but not a fundamental change in direction of the country away from the West. However, the failed coup has driven the wedge between Turkey and the US even further. It was the last major blow to the strategic partnership (Elnigar Iltebir 2016).
The study also finds that, while international factors played an important role in preparing the ground for Turkish foreign policy change, domestic factors, particularly Turkeys economic interests, its new foreign policy elite and their vision, and Turkish public opinion, have been the main drivers of its foreign policy change (Directed by Professor I.M. Destler, Maryland School of Public Policy, University of Maryland College Park).

A brief outline of the July 15, 2016 coup:
The majority of Turks believe that the CIA fabricated evidence that the Kemalist Turkish Armed Forces were about to overthrow the democratically elected regime, AKP Justice and Development Party. As stated above, 247 military officers were imprisoned, including generals. The evidence was found to be a fake by the Turkish Supreme Court and there was no evidence produced to connect this false evidence to CIA. However, Henri J. Barkey, former CIA field agent to Turkey, made the statement, “AKP ile TSK yi Kafesledik.” English translation - “AKP Justice and Development party and us (CIA) put the Turkish military into a cage.” Furthermore, he boasted with details about how the CIA and AKP together rendered the military ineffective in interfering with government affairs.
In 2010, there were again escalating tensions between the powerful military of Turkey and the Turkish government, due to the court ordered formal arrests of twenty current and former officers with charges that they plotted a coup. The twenty officers were arrested and were among forty-nine people detained as part of the investigation that alleges they were part of the 2003 military plan referred to as Sledgehammer. The prosecution alleges that at that time the military intended to incite chaos to justify the takeover of the government, known as the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which came to power in 2002 (New York Times.2010, Vol. 159 Issue 54962, p4. 0p).
After three-and–a-half years of the military officers being jailed, the Turkish Judiciary finally came to conclusion that there was no solid evidence of a plan to overthrow Erdogan’s government, and all the imprisoned military officers were freed. It must be made clear that after the failed coup in July 2016, these jailed generals and officers were reinstated to active duty and all of the officers and generals who were followers of Gulen were put into prison. The CIA, along with AKP-Gulen movement, did this in the hope of eliminating the military’s influence on foreign policy (author unknown, washingtonpost 2016).
This last event, in which the CIA financed the failed Turkish coup, was planned by retired ISAF General J. F. Campbell. The Turkish papers have the proof of his involvement. Some of the money, hidden in briefcases, was later retrieved. It must be added that, after the failed coup, the US removed all its nuclear war heads from Incirlik Air Base and relocated them to Romania. The pentagon would not comment on the nuclear weapon’s removal from Turkey.
Here, the US was caught red-handed. 96% of Turks believe that US was behind the coup to overthrow Erdogan and bring Fatiullah Gulen to power. Gulen and his followers want to change the identity of Turkey from a secular democracy to mild Islamic republic like Iran. The coup was planned by the CIA and executed by the Gulen followers in the armed forces and in the police force and judiciary. It was the Turkish people and the Kemalist officers in the Turkish Armed Forces that stopped the coup. 
“Such similarity could be an indication that it was actually created by the CIA, because the agency established these sects disguised as non-governmental organizations to “make changes to society,” the indictment reads (https://www.rt.com/news/357944-gulen-movement-founded-cia/).

Obstacles impeding the partnership:
US support of Kurds and ties to the crisis in Syria:
One of the major problems with the relationship between US and Turkey has been the controversial Kurdish issue which has remained intact during the past decade. Turkish officials and the Turkish public were totally convinced that the PKK was the main beneficiary of the Iraq war. The PKK, declared by the US and Turkey as a terrorist organization, took advantage of the absence of central government in Northern Iraq and expanded its bases there for attacks against Turkey (Sayari, 2013. p 132). The American unwillingness to militarily remove the PKK bases from Northern Iraq added further criticism directed at US (Sayari, 2013. p 132). 
“The Trouble with Turkey,” by Totten, Michael J. In his article, Totten states that the YPG is the only ally of the US in the area able to fight against ISIS. The US point of view is that the Kurds in Syria formed YPG and thus are a trustworthy alliance to US. Therefore, the US supports the YPG in every area including giving weapons and advisory help to fight against ISIS. The PKK (who is the Turkish side of the Kurdish YPG in Syria) and the YPG formed an alliance long before the US allied with the YPG.
Why does America support the YPG? 
The Turks can easily understand America’s motive, because America is not allowed to strike from its bases on Turkish soil. America doesn’t consider the fact that anytime they launch an offensive from its bases on Turkish soil, Turkey ends up having to deal with its neighbors. In contrast, here in America, the US cushioned from troubled areas by thousands of miles of ocean, whereas Turkey has 910 miles of border with Iraq and Syria. As long as the US supports the YPG, Turkey has to fight the YPG and can’t be allied with US. 
The issue stems from the PYD and its armed wing, the YPG, which the United States supports in Syria. As reported in many intelligence reports, be it confidential or otherwise, the YPG is clearly a branch of the PKK terror organization and evidently there is an organic link between the two organizations. The PYD grounds itself on the Group of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK) agreement, based on the principles of communism and is known to serve as the constitution of the PKK. The US administration disregards these obvious facts because doing so serves its current interests in Syria and acts upon the assumption that the YPG is an effective force against the ISIS (Harun, 2016).
Proof of this can be found in the fact that the recent American weapon supplies to the YPG end up in Turkish cities in the hands of the PKK (Turkish Arm Forces Website). Also, in the peer review of the Totten’s article, the author forgot to mention the fact that the US and western allies openly support PKK. Also not mentioned is the fact that the PKK has headquarters in Paris and has German supplies of weapons and military advisors (a German Colonel found dead in a hotel in Kerkuk 2014).
Also, the Armenian ASALA terrorist organization joined PKK. Proof of this is found in recent clashes between Turkish Special Forces and the PKK, which ended with seven PKK sharp shooters being killed by Turkish forces (TAF website). Five of the sharp shooters were Armenian commandos; two were Serbian. The PKK wanted to send the five Armenian bodies to Armenia; opening up the fact that Armenian troops are fighting alongside the PKK. As far as the two Serbian bodies, the Serbian government denies anything to do with the PKK and insists that those Serbian nationals acted on their own. The end result - the US openly supporting the YPG and indirectly supporting the PKK destabilizes Turkey. Since 1984, 40,000 Turkish citizens of Kurdish decent have been killed by the PKK (Turkish Arm Forces website).
The US has a dilemma on its hands due to the fact of its reluctance to take action against PKK in Northern Iraq for the fear of alienating the northern Kurds who had emerged as America’s chief ally in Iraq war (Sayari, 2013. p 132). This scenario also made the Turks believe that the US is helping Kurdish nationalists in Turkey to carve out an independent state out of South Eastern Turkish territory. Despite Washington’s repeated declaration that the US was on the Turkish side for defeating PKK, the anti-American sentiment remained strong (Sayari, 2013. p 133). So, the US sees 
During the past six years, Syria has been destabilized and ISIS has taken hold. As a result, Syrians have been fleeing out of Syria slowly but surely, depopulating the country. The US is supporting the YPG (Kurds) so that the YPG can gain control of northern Syria. In Turkey, the PKK is the YPG equivalent. Any help given to the YPG also channels aid to help the PKK, who are also trying to carve out southeastern Turkey to form a greater Kurdistan country (Almuktar and Wallace, 2015). 
Turkey’s decision to join the fight against the Islamic State was driven in part by the threat posed by YPG’s rapid territorial gains within Syria. YPG is a part of PKK in Turkey who are fighting to divide Turkey in the hope of joining together for a greater Kurdistan. Kurds across the region have historically had not established an independent state, which the Turkish government strongly opposes (New York Times 2015).
Mr. Erdogan has said that Turkey “will never allow the establishment of a new state on our southern frontier in the north of Syria.”(New York Times 2015).
The following article appeared in Washington institute of policy-analysis by Cagaptay and Tabler “Washington may hold the key for a re-alignment of the Turkish approach towards a productive outcome in both Syria and Iraq. A proactive policy that seeks to restore the damaged trust between Turkey and the United States ought to be at the forefront of the concerns of next US administration. However, autocracy and the abuse of authority, even in the context of reacting to a coup, cannot be overlooked. A respectful, constructive, and principled engagement with President Erdogan should point to the two paths that Turkey can follow: a restoration of the rule of law and a salvaging of democracy, achieved jointly with the reconfirmation of Turkey’s central place as a US ally whose vital interests are safeguarded; or taking Turkey for a game of Russian roulette with a false dose of security through exclusion and animosity followed by potentially irreversible damage.”(Cagaptay and Tabler 2015). There are two points that must be addressed here. Erdogan must restore the rule of law and salvaging the democracy otherwise Turkey for the game of Russian roulette and irreversible damage. It is the writers opinion that Turkey turning to Russia-China orbit is disastrous, however the author forgetting the fact that Turkey draw its borders by fighting the European imperialist nations at the time when it had virtually no army under the great leader Kemal Ataturk. In other words the author threatening current situation obey the West or else. America may carve a country from Syria and Iraq for the Kurds, but not from Turkey. In fact the Turkish boundaries will be enlarged.
Why is America supporting the Kurds?pastedGraphic.pngTURKEY-Adana, Incirlik 

By creating a greater Kurdish country, America can move its bases from Turkey, where it is restricted to operate, to American bases in Kurdistan where it can easily operate pre-emptive strikes to anywhere it wants. The US can also develop this newly formed country into an open market for American goods. Re-mapping the Middle East has been the plan of the imperialists for the last 80 years and that is why literature reviews of other written articles must be included. The Wall Street Journal, in a leader column entitled “Our non-ally in Ankara” the piece asserted that “Turkey had long ago stopped acting like an ally of the US or a friend to the west, and proposed replacing the NATO air base at Incirlik with one in the territory of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) (Park, 2013).

Turkish attitudes toward Americans:
In 2007, world public opinion polls regarding the US, showed that Turks had an 83% unfavorable opinion of Americans; up from 63% in previous years (Pew research center 2016).  Today, the latest public opinion poll, tested by TESEF, a Turkish polling company, indicate 96% of Turks have an unfavorable opinion of Americans. In addition, they believe that the CIA pulled the strings on Gulen and masterminded the coup.Pew research center (Erdogan 2016).    
A detailed public opinion piece studied by Bilali, includes how the US is perceived as the barbarian in the context of the US invasion of Iraq. However, within Turkey-US relations, the American threat in the Turks’ view might be related to exploitation of resources. As such, images of a country might not only reflect the structural relations between the two actor’s domestic policies, but also its standing in the broader international arena. Global polls (Pew Global Attitude Project, 2008) show that favorability ratings of the US have declined after the US invasion of Iraq in a variety of countries that were not directly involved with or effected by the invasion. I In the current research, the assessment of the barbarian might reflect a general image of the US in the world as related to its policies in the Middle East, while the measurement of the imperialist and the ally might reflect more specially an image of the US in the context of Turkey-US relations (Bilali, 2010). The author used both qualitative as well as quantitative methods, by doing surveys with 85 university students in Turkey. The author was testing the Turkish public opinion about US. The author used multiple hypotheses: one that Turks as Muslims view Americans as barbarians and two that Turks as Turks sees Americans as imperialists and that the US views Turkey as its colony (Bilali, 2010).

Turkey bandwagoning and balancing power:
As stated in the article by Stephen M. Walt Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning, states consider Bandwagoning or Balancing power. Considering this theory and applying it to Turkey, Turkey is doing both. Bandwagoning, i.e joining Russia and the China block. This was evident during the G-20 meetings in the city of Hangzaou China, September 2016.  Turkey’s President Erdogan was seated between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin. 
This scenario has never happened in any previous G-20 meetings. After the shooting down of a Russian S-24 fighter jet in December 2015, President Erdogan apologized to Russia and the relationship between the two countries was put on the fast track. After the St. Petersburg meeting, the old trade agreement of approximately 30 billion dollars will be increased to 100 billion dollars; including many areas industry including defense. Furthermore, President Putin put forward the implementation of this new trade agreement with the use of exchanging Ruble and Lira; hence bypassing the usually used currency of the US dollar. 
As to the balance part of bandwagoning and balance, Turkey is trying to balance its power against the hegemonic power of the US, resulting in a security dilemma. Turkey is afraid of the Middle East crisis and thinks that Western countries, especially the US, are trying to divide Turkey just like the Europeans did during WWI against the Ottoman Empire. Turkey’s European dream has come to an end; Turkey has initiated to join the Shanghai five, and is also in the process of forming a Turkic union 
Although Turkey is still a member of NATO, Now, Turkey has moved from the western orbit of the US to the Eastern orbit of Russia/China, but has not totally cut off Europe or the US. Although Turkey is still a member of NATO, debate the how long Turkey will actually stay in NATO. Turkey and the US have a trade capacity just under 20 billion dollars, although the US portion is 12 billion dollars and the Turkish portion is 8 billion dollars. In comparison, as mentioned above, the Turkish-Russian trade agreement is set to increase from 30 billion to 100 billion. 

Turkey’s move toward Russia:
“The Risk Report: Turkey and Russia Get Closer and Worry the West,” by Ian Bremmer:
When Turkey shot down a Russian fighter jet near Turkey’s Syrian border, it immediately provoked fears in Western capitals that Ankara and Moscow might stumble into conflict. In June 2016, Erdogan apologized to Russia, but before the apology took place, Erdogan sent a dozen of Republican Peoples Party members of parliament (CHP) to Russia with the message that the two countries must stay together. Both Vladimir Putin and Erdogan have issues with the West and have signaled that Turkey will apologize for the downing of the jet.
In July 2016, when Erdogan was facing the coup attempt, the French newspapers reported that it was Russia that warned about the Turkish F/16 jets being used during the coup attempt. In the event they fired on Erdogan’s plane, the Russians were locked on the Turkish F/16’s and would have fired on them using S-400 long range missiles in Syria. So, the US saw and heard  this warning. After all, it was the US that planned the failed coup attempt, despite the fact that Obama denies it. The Turks firmly believed the CIA masterminded the failed coup and Gulen followers execute the coup. Erdogan’s subsequent detention of tens of thousands of suspected enemies has drawn sharp criticism from both the US and European NATO allies.
On August 9, 2016, Erdogan made headlines by flying to Russia for his first meeting with Vladimir Putin since the plane fiasco, and the West now fears that Turkey and Russia are moving too close together. Pro-government Turkish newspapers accused the US. Putin expressed support for Erdogan’s government during the coup’s early hours and has remained silent as Erdogan jailed those his government accused of treachery. The US and the West, by contrast, were slow to support Erdogan that night and has sharply criticized his crackdown. Turkey’s government has detained the Turkish pilots who shot down the Russian aircraft on suspicion of involvement in the coup attempt. From this meeting, both men will get some things they want, including the issue of the Crimean Tatars whose origin is Turkic (the Turks share an ancestral kinship with Tatars). Putin’s aim is to put doubt in NATO members’ minds about Turkey’s reliability and gain a freer hand to extend Russia’s naval capabilities in the Black Sea (Bremmer, I. 2016).
He might also get a softer Turkish attitude towards both Russia’s treatment of Tatars, in Ukraine. Also, with regards to the issue of Syria, Putin considers Assad a friend, while Erdogan considers him an enemy. The fact is, Erdogan has already changed his foreign policy towards Syria and is cooperating with Russia for a solution. Erdogan also got back the former treaties with Russia with regards to food exports and the return of Russian tourists visiting Turkey. Russia and Turkey also agreed upon new energy deals, and pipelines under the Black Sea to carry Russian natural gas to Europe (Bremmer, 2016).
The US and Europe are watching carefully to see just how far these better relations might go. Here is the tricky part. Erdogan has long aspired to join and push for Turkey's full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a China-and Russia-led alliance that NATO fears might one day become a military block (Bremmer, 2016). Erdogan has edged in that direction and furthermore, Erdogan has set up a commission to cooperate with Russia and China in the defense industry. Recent newspapers articles indicate that Russia will train and take the Turkish astronauts to the International Space Station. In all the US-Turkish alliances, the US has refused to take Turkish astronauts into space, all the while allowing astronauts from Saudi Arabia, Italy, Japan and many more countries. Finally, Erdogan won’t withdraw from NATO just yet, he isn’t likely to cut ties with the US.  But Turkey's relation with Russia and China will definitely be improved (Bremmer, 2016). 
Iraqi war:
The US decision to over-throw Saddam and the Turkish parliament’s refusal to permit the American military to use Turkey as a launching pad at the beginning of the second Iraq War sent shock waves to Washington and caused the most serious crisis in Turkish-American relations since the imposition of arms embargo on Turkey by the US Congress in 1975 (Sayari, 2013. p 132). The refusal of allowing US troops to pass through Turkey by the Turkish parliament provoked intense American frustration and anger toward Turkey from US perspective. The majority of Turks believe that the “hooding” of the Turkish Special Forces team in Northern Iraq in July 2003 by the American military for allegedly plotting to assassinate an Iraqi Kurdish politician was an attempt by the US to punish Turkey for its refusal to support US war plans. The highly publicized Abu Ghraib abuse by the US military engulfed all segments of society in Turkey and an astonishing rise of anti-Americanism, with the exception of Kurdish citizens who welcomed the American occupation of northern Iraq (Sayari, 2013. p 132).
 
Turkish-Israeli relations:
While the Arab Spring brought cooperation between the two allies on major security problems, the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations had a negative impact on bilateral relations. Turkey and Israel had developed close ties by signing military training and education agreements in February 1996. These two countries both have strong militaries in the Middle East. The Israeli-Turkish accord was welcomed by the Clinton administration, but the Israeli-Turkish relationship rapidly deteriorated later after the Turkish leadership began its strong criticism of Israel (Sayari, 2013. p 134).
After the Israeli commando raid on a Turkish flotilla carrying activists opposing the naval blockade of Gaza, there were frequent reports about Turkey’s growing estrangement from the West and shifting axis of Turkish foreign policy, and the prediction was that Turkey was gradually drifting away from western alliance and in search of new alliance in the Middle East and Eurasia. The American policy makers were irritated by Turkey’s new initiatives in the Middle East that were at odds with the US.
In January 2008, while Erdogan was orchestrating the negotiation between Israel and Syria, Israel’s one month bombing of Gaza left Erdogan feeling betrayed. In retaliation, Erdogan had strong criticism of Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos, and declared Israel as a terrorist state. There was also the Israeli commando raid on a Turkish flotilla, and an Israeli counter-attack on Gaza in retaliation to Hamas. The crisis in the Israeli-Turkish relations threatened to undermine the Jewish lobby’s support to Turkey in the US Congress in the all-important opposition of the Armenian genocide bill, who had been supporting Turkey for four decades (Sayari, 2013. p 134).

Armenian issue:
One of the major concerns to Turks is the repeated annual efforts of the Armenian-American lobby to pass a “genocide resolution” in the US Congress. This has created a crisis in the bilateral relations (Sayari, 2013. p 131). During the second Iraq war, the Armenian lobby attempted to pass a genocide bill in the US Congress. 226 senators intended to vote yes for the approval of the bill before it came to the floor to debate. In response, Turkey pulled its Ambassador back to Turkey and also made it clear that no more US troops would be allowed passage through Turkey returning from the war in Iraq. The American public and the “yes” senators totally taken by surprise; not fully understanding the consequences of the approval of this bill. Many newly elected senators did not know the importance of the US-Turkish relationship. The Armenian lobby had contributed to the campaigns to the newly elected senators and believed it was a “done deal.” In addition, the regional security problems in the Middle East, the decline of American power in the world, the general direction of changing multi-polarity in the international system and Turkey’s the new foreign policy orientation under AKP government, all these factors contributed to US-Turkish strained relationship (Sayari, 2013. p 131).  
 
Monopoly of America defense companies:
Another important issue was the monopoly of American defense companies and Turkish military arms. In 2013, Turkey wanted to sign an agreement with China to renew its long range missile program, but the US and western defense companies, along with NATO, fiercely opposed the Turkish-Chinese deal, arguing that the Chinese system would not be compatible with NATO arms. But, the Chinese not only offered lesser dollars amount to the missile tender, they were also willing to share technology with Turkey. The same system offered by US was 4 to 5 billion dollars, whereas China’s bid was 3.5 billion dollars. The US did not want to share technology whereas, China agreed to manufacture half of the systems in Turkey, which would mean a lot of jobs for Turkish engineers. In the end, President Erdogan bowed to the pressure exerted by US and NATO, and had to refuse the Chinese bid. This event caused great resentment of the Turks towards the US (Park, 2015). 

Global change from bi-polarity to uni-polarity:
After the demise of the USSR, the structure of the international system changed from bipolarity to uni-polarity under the American hegemony. The Gulf wars highlighted the mighty American military strength, but Turkey reacted to the Iraq war with considerable concern and anxiety. Although the Turkish government welcomed the demise of USSR, it also worried about Turkey’s strategic importance for the West especially for US (Sayari, 2013. p 135). 
The multipolar international system has had a strong impact on Turkey-US relations. The Iraq and Afghan wars, the perception about America’s declining power have become the talk of the time and widespread among Turkish policymakers and the public alike. These aspirations have become the influential for greater independence and strategic autonomy of foreign policy making.
Turkey’s foreign minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, has been the chief architect of Turkish foreign policy during the past decade. He persistently argued that bilateral relations between Turkey and US must be restructured on the basis of an equal partnership and Turkey’s emerging role in the world affairs (Sayari, 2013. p 136). This is the main issue America disliked and disagreed with. In the last decade the US government has remained silent to Turkey’s engagement in the Middle East.
America’s uneasiness has grown with AKP’s close ties to Hamas and some of the radically anti-Western regional political actors such as Iran and Syria (Sayari, 2013. p 136). The previous secular governments in Turkey, including the 59th government headed by prime minster Ecevit have had an active regional policy without jeopardizing its relation with the West. But, AKP’s inexperienced foreign policy making has alerted the US that Turkey’s zero problems with its neighbors turned out to be the major problems with Turkey’s traditional Western allies (Sayari., 2013. p 136).
Example: Davutoglu’s zero problems with Turkey’s neighbors Syria and Iran have created an antagonistic relationship with Turkey’s major ally the US. So Erdogan’s government’s effort to develop close relations with Iran and looking the other way at Iran’s nuclear development program have signaled the wrong impression to the US and the west. AKP’s hostile policy towards Israel has created another divergence between Turkey and the US (Sayari, 2013. p 137). AKP’s persistent hostile policies towards Israel and is clueless that the Israeli-Turkish relationship is not bilateral, but a trilateral one. “This growing hostility between Israel and Turkey and Erdogan’s critical of America’s unwillingness to stop Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians, added new strains between Ankara and Washington” (Sayari, 2013. p 139).
Finally, due to Turkey’s new foreign policy initiatives, bilateral relations no longer conform to that which existed during a bipolar world. In the era of uni-polarity under American hegemony, the relations between Turkey and the US have been increasingly “loose interdependence.” This new behavior translates that each country maintain important military and political ties, but choose to cooperate in some issues, and not on the others.
For example, the Turkish government chose to cooperate with America’s war in Afghanistan, but chose to oppose the American invasion of Iraq (Sayari, 2013. p 138). Turkey does not want a nuclear Iran, but chose to maintain close economic ties such as energy and trade despite Washington’s effort to impose strong economic sanctions on the Islamic republic of Iran. What this means is that the bilateral relations are very hard to maintain, much more than it was before 1990s (Sayari, 2013. p 138).

The Syrian Crisis:
By far, the Syrian crisis is the main obstacle straining US-Turkey relations. More incidents have occurred between Turkey and the US during the Arab Spring. Initially, the Arab Spring brought the two countries together and both Washington and Ankara had agreed to the regime change in Syria. But as the civil war dragged, Turkey wanted a safe fly zone in Syria and strong measurements in overthrowing Assad. The US only offered logistical and intelligence support to the opposition fighting forces (Sayari, 2013, p 134). Turkey’s concern is to overthrow the Assad regime and opposes the creation of a Kurdish independent country, while US has focused its policy in fighting the ISIS.
Both countries need each other in any settlements in Syria, but it cannot be under the US interest only (Ahmad 16). The US is directly assisting the PYD and US troops are openly wearing Kurdish military sigma despite Turkey’s opposition. This has created a serious rift between the two countries. The US’s cooperation with the PYD has generated a deep mistrust of US on the Turkish side, as long as this cooperation continues the US cannot be allies to Turkey (Ahmad, 2015 p 16).
As to a brief history, after WWI, both Turkey and Syria had national interests to maintain stability in the Middle East; the common interests were counter terrorism, sectarian extremism, securing energy flows, and maintaining good relations with Europe (Ahmad 13). This relationship grew thorny over the Hatay Province which Turkey annexed in 1939. It was the referendum that people of Hatay chose to be part of Republic of Turkey. Also were the conflict of water disputes over the Tigris and Euphrates rivers basin, and Turkey’s close relations with West and Israel in particular. In retaliation, Syria’s chose to support PKK and both countries were on opposite sides during Cold War. In the 1990’s, Turkish policy with Syria was the security threat of Syrian support of PKK. In the last decade, Turkey has developed wide relations with Syria, based on Turkey’s zero problems with its neighbors. In March 2011, with Assad’s brutal crackdown on protesters, Turkey’s response was slow. Later Turkey began to support the Syrian political opposition and by allowing the group members to stay in Turkey (Ahmad, 2015 p 13).
Since then, Turkey has suspended its diplomatic relations with Syria and imposed sanctions on Syria in order to put more pressure on Assad. This development sharpened the competition between Turkey and Iran (Ahmad, 2015 p 13). This was Erdogan’s policy to defeat the Syrian regime and establish a no-fly zone to settle the refugees and to stop the refugees from flooding Turkey. However, Erdogan’s policies were ignored by Obama administration.
This is where Erdogan turned against US. Turkey’s aspiration to become the regional power has not been confined to Middle East but the Black Sea area, the Balkans, Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey missed the opportunity by not fully cooperating with US in Iraq war (Ahmad, 2015 p 14). Turkey strongly mistrusted allowing foreign troops into its territory, this fear came from the independence days of fighting to free itself from the European and Russian powers. The widely perceived image of US fit in the eyes of Turks not to trust any powers and the fear was that allowing 80,000 troops onto its soil in 2003 would pose threat to Turkey, especially with the US supporting Kurds. Some of its politicians openly uttered their intentions to curve out a country from Turkey, Syria and Iraq for Kurds. Turkey’s deep-seated fear of the state’s territorial dismantlement. The Syrian Kurds are now openly preparing to gain independence by acquiring territories from Syria, Iraq and Turkey. In the minds of Turk unless foreign powers wipe out the existence of Turkey, it will never allow that happen. It will not hesitate to go to war with hegemonic power to protect the integrity of its territories. 
The Turkish foreign policy evaluations regarding Syria reflect that the Turks are still living in Ottoman times that it influenced Middle East. This was apparent according to the International Strategic Research Organization (USAK) report that there are only six diplomats out of 135 working in 20 Arab countries speaking the Arabic language. Far from the Ottoman times, Turkey has over-estimated its influence over Assad. Turkey was overconfident in its knowledge about Syria, when, in reality, the Turks lack knowledge and intelligence regarding Syria (Ahmad, 2015 p 14).
Turkey under estimated the Assad military power, which was obvious when Syrian forces shot down a Turkish war plane. Besides that, Assad’s military is comprised of Russian military hardware. If Turkey is to take down Assad militarily, it would escalate into a major war between Russia and the US. Turkey has been wrong in its assumptions about Syria and its prolonged strength (Ahmad, 2015 p 15).
After the Arab Spring, the US and Turkey had a joint Syrian policy to overthrow Assad. Later, the US abolished this idea as the civil war dragged on and Erdogan was left alone. Erdogan turning against the US further complicated US/Turkish relations (Altunisik, 2006).
To understand this issue, the Middle East as a whole must be evaluated from different perspectives. The Turkish public view is that the US and its other close ally, Israel, are trying to carve a country for the Kurds by taking lands from Iraq, Syria and Turkey. This process started first with the invasion of Iraq in order to free the country from the dictatorship of Saddam; the end result that northern Iraq would be given to the Kurdish population (Cagaptay and Tabler 2015).
The Syrian civil war has turned into a proxy war for the larger strategic struggle for power in the Middle East between many actors. The US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan are the Western block and the anti-Western block include Russia, Iran, Syria and Lebanon. It started with the attempt to remove Assad and the prolonged civil war, resulting in millions of Syrian people killed and displaced, the presence of ISIS and the strong support for the Syrian regime by its allies; the Syrian crisis turned into a global security dilemma.
This crisis is directly jeopardizing the interest of both US and Turkey. The US, as well as Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Sunni population), do not want Iran Shiite population) to become a regional power. As a result the sectarian conflicts and the US national interests are foiling Iran’s aspiration of regional power and the lessening of the dominance of political Islam (Ahmad, 2015, 2015). 
The stability of the Middle East is of interest to Turkey and Syria in regards to countering terrorism, securing energy flow, ending water disputes between Syria and Turkey and maintaining important relations with Europe (Ahmad, 2015, p 13). 
Turkey is deeply troubled and angered by US and NATO refusal or inability to intervene or to aid Turkey to overthrow Assad regime. This is due to the Russian factor, and to the fact as US administration does not view its vital interest involved and no desire to intervene militarily.
The US policy towards Syria initially humanitarian in nature but real issues were the Syria’s support of Hezbollah and Palestinian extremists, dealing with Syria’s chemical weapons and encourage peace talks with Israel. Despite Assad’s brutal forceful actions against the opposition groups Obama administration’s misguided approach and indecisive actions about the next step contributed to the deteriorating situation on the ground. Furthermore, the US-trained groups changed sides to ISIS, as to who play the most, and the US failed to stir a robust response (Ahmad, 2015, p 15). The creation of ISIS turned the US’s attention to defeating ISIS, this is where Kurds play the role, the only loyal ally to US.
From Turkey’s perspective, the US-Turkish cooperation has not been successful. The crisis has caused financial, human, diplomatic, and refugee expenses to Turkey. The US has adapted a “leading from behind” approach. The Obama administration has been reluctant on providing greater backing for the Syrian opposition, which has led Turkey to question the US’s real intentions in US-Turkish cooperation. The international community is not interested in creating a safe haven with a no-fly zone along the Turkish border. Turkey has been left alone and is frustrated by the lack of NATO and international support towards more concrete settlements of Syrian crisis (Ahmad, 2015, p 17).
Finally, the problems of over three-and-a-half million refugees, sectarian violence, and insecurity across the Turkish Syrian border has effected the nature of Turkey’s relations with the US and the West in general. Turkey is angered by the US and NATO’s refusal to intervene or even aid Turkey, and is deeply concerned about its security. The ninety percent of Turks think that the US is not a friend, but major enemy.
Turkey will maintain its current policy on Syria until the US spells out clearly what its future plans are for Syria; also Turkey is concerned that president-elect Trump may join with Putin to accept Assad. Some Turkish scholars and observers think that Turkey’s stand on taking a course of action to fight against ISIS is the correct one, the US led operation is clearly unsuccessful. The coalition is pursuing a misguided strategy and Turkey should stay out of it (Ahmad 17). 
Soner Yalcin, a Turkish columnist, analyzes the Middle East is as follows (translated):
“What is really happening in our southern border? What is the meaning of Israel’s quietness in the Middle East? Cerablis, Afrin, Mehbic, these are the cities Syrian military and YPG fight over and both sides declared peace. Turkish forces invaded Cerablis and the operation named “Firat Kalkani” meaning Euphrates shields. The newspapers headlines are constantly showing which district under who all of these conflicting headlines confuses the Turkish public and the international viewers. There are more than enough expert specialists and their tin sticks over the maps trying to figure out which group occupy what city or district. Everyone talking about the strategies of each group. And to follow these groups and their names all intermingled to follow who is who? Really what is happing in Syria? We have the main enemy ISIS, Syrian opposition army, YPG, Kurdish group, Peshmerga group, US special forces aiding the YPG, YPD further more Syrian army, Russian war planes bombing the opposition, the Turkmen group, Iraqi army and the US war planes taking off from the Incirlik and from the carriers giving support to Kurds because they are the best forces against ISIS that US claims” (Yalcin 2016). 

Now, to further explain this, if we look at the Syrian civil war from a bird’s eye view, there is another reality that can easily be observed. The Syrian civil war involves the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey, France, England, Qatar, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq and includes Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, Al Qaida, Al-Nursa, Bargain and PKK. So, who is not there? Even the international media does not mention it. Whose name has never crossed the entire media of the world? The neighboring country of Syria – Israel. Furthermore, Israel had numerous wars with Syria. Why has Israel’s name never been mentioned in the Syrian war? When the earlier AKP government tried to go between Israel and Syria, Israel became uncomfortable. That is why Syria is important for Israel. When the international media and the satellite watch discovered the movement of the Syrian army and aided the opposition, the greatest care was taken to hide Israel from the world media. But, the cold, hard fact remains - Israel is behind the Syrian crisis. That begs the question - what is Israel after in Syria? The main objective is to show the world that the roots of the Syrian civil war are sectarian in nature. It was reported previously that Mossad trained the ISIS leader. This ISIS leader also openly said he has no arguments with Israel. The major powers are trying to show that the civil war in Syria is also a civilization war between Christian and Islam. Also, the players are wanting to show the world that the civil war’s roots are ethnic based, involving Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmen. Again, where is Israel in this picture? They are not. According to the Old Testament, this area was promised to the Jews. The Promised Land. The Promised Land covers Israel, Palestine, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Syria’s borders. Canaan country was held for 500 years by Israelis 1500-1000 BCE. The Zionists Jews never wanted to give up these lands. So Israel’s never ending war with Syria is the root of this intent to regain historical lands, the Promised Lands (Yalcin, 2016).
Let’s ask a few more pertinent questions. Why is the Syrian civil war moving to the North bordering Turkey? Before the civil war, the Kurds in Syria were ragtag fragmented groups here and there groups. Who organized these rag tag groups and brought them together to form one large ethnic group? How did the PKK- YPG become the major units against ISIS who were powerful enough to defeat the Syrian and Iraqi armies, and gained all that territory alongside the Turkish border almost all the way to the Mediterranean? And why is PKK-PYG’s main aim to reach the Mediterranean Sea? Who created the terrorist activities in Turkey so that Turkey is distracted from what is going on near its southern borders? Who planned the failed coup in Turkey? The Turks know who is behind all of the above and for what purpose.
The first plan is to establish the Kurdish/Jewish nation reaching all the way to Mediterranean Sea and then the greater Israel (Yalcin, 2016). English translated. 

The Future
“Resetting U.S.-Turkish Relations: Charting a New Way Forward” from Journal of Strategic Security [1944-0464] Stein, Aaron yr:2011 vol:4 iss:1 pg:1 -18. The Mavi Marmara incident has also exacerbated the Turkish/US relations. The policy makers in Washington question Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. The policy makers in both countries need to acknowledge that their disagreements are not about their overall vision for the region. They have to work out their foreign policy differences where they overlap. Both countries must keep this broader vision in perspective and open to dialogue to clearly transmit these ideas to each other, while working together to achieve this. In the eyes of Turks, the US is trying to carve out South Easter Turkey for the Kurds (Stein 2011).
To recap - after the Cold War ended, the US-Turkish alliance become questionable. Turkish foreign and security policymakers were concerned that the US was no longer a reliable security partner and Turkey was not sure whether the US would abandon Turkey altogether. But the common threat of terrorism in the regions has brought the two alliances together once again; the regional changes such as the Balkans, Middle East and Caspian regions which surrounds Turkey (Altunisik 2006). 
As other authors, such as Ian Lesser, have indicated, Turkey’s strategic position is important to US. In the Middle East the two alliances cooperated in security and this cooperation exposed competitive and divergent interests (Altunisik,  2006). The US-Turkish alliance had always had Middle East dimensions during the Cold War era. After the end of containment policy toward the USSR ended, Turkey was reluctant to cooperate under US policy. The end of bipolarity has changed the context of US-Turkey alliance. The decrease in Turkey’s dependence on US has changed that partnership. The US always had the upper hand when dealing with regional issues, but now that equation has changed (Altunisik, 2006). Turkey is no longer dependent on US military hardware to defend itself. The last major purchase of military equipment was the F-35’s, the NATO approved fighter planes which Turkey and many other NATO nations have partnered to the common project. Turkey now designs manufactures its own military hardware. It does not need the delayed deliveries of paid military weapons due to certain lobbies in the US (Altunisik, 2006).
Besides the Iraqi issues, some observers point out that if there are no agreements between Turkey and the US on Syria and Kurdish issues. With incoming president-elect Trump and the majority held in both houses of Congress by the Republicans, the Turks fear that the US might attempt to retaliate against the Turkish government by passing bills in both chambers. This has heightened the already anti-Americanism in Turkey. If the Armenian issue receives support of the US, the political parties in Turkey might take advantage of these tensions. Similarly, Turkey’s request of Fatiullah Gulen’s extradition might create new tensions in the bilateral relations. So these divergences are not likely to change unless a major breakthrough changes the course of event (Ahmad, P. T. 2015. 17).
Therefore, unless these obstacles are addressed, the US-Turkish partnership may not end soon, but it is certain that it will end somewhere down the road. It is imperative that the Trump administration view the partnership differently and acknowledge its importance. Sadly, most presidents say one thing during the election and when they assume the presidency their views change. Essentially, American foreign policy is the same whether the Republicans or Democrats are in power, unless, of course, Trump’s foreign policy changes.
The future US-Turkish alliance should involve both political and economic cooperation. The economic cooperation should include the business sector, and trade opportunities for both sides. Current trade capacity should be increased to $100 billion. The US-Turkish partnership must include other regions such as central Asian countries, as well as the Caspian area. US foreign policy in central Asia is not satisfactory from the US point of view (Ustun and Kanat 2013). Turkey and the United States must re-evaluate their partnership. The US foreign policy interest towards Asia-Pacific region cannot be successfully achieved unilaterally without Turkey and other actors in the region. The US action in Syria and the Turkish position towards YPG Kurds, Iran are the obstacles and depending how this plays out will determine the partnership (Ustun and Kanat, 2013).
The Trump administration and Turkey have an opportunity to cooperate and move forward in helping to build a more democratic and thriving Middle East and central Asia. Turkey’s strategic position and soft power make it not only a good partner in this effort, but also the US’s only partner with enough influence both in the Middle East and Central Asia. The US should engage Turkey in its plans to set up a safe area inside Syria. Turkey needs to convince the new administration in the US to commit in principal. There may be chance that the president elect’s choice of General Flynn as his top security advisor is a good indicator that there will be a start to correcting the US-Syrian policies. General Flynn acknowledges that not only that radical Islam exists, but that all of Islam is a problem and must be taken care of. This is the sole remedy for the refugee problem (Ahmad, 2015. p 17). 
 How will the game in the Middle East be played out? Who will be the winners and the losers? These are the questions going forward. This game is going to be prolonged, but it will become clearer in the future. 
  





Bibliography

Ahmad, P. T. (2015). U.S.-Turkey Relationship and Syrian Crisis. Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, 14(4), 11-19. 

Altunisik, M. B. (2006). “From Distance Neighbors to Partners? Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,” Security diologue vol 37. Retrieved from www.chathamhouse.org.

Aykan, M. B. (1996). Turkish perspectives on Turkish-US relations concerning Persian Gulf security in the post-Cold War era: 1989-1995 The Middle East Journal 50.3 344. 

Aykan, M. B. (1999). “The Turkish-Syrian Crisis of October 1999, A Turkish View” MiddleEast Policy, 6, (4), June 1999.

Cagaptay, S. and Tabler, A.J. (2015). The US-PYD-Turkey puzzle. Policywatch 2510 The Washington Institude for Near East Policy. Retrieved from http://washingtoninstitude.org/policy-analysis/view/the-u.s.-pyd-turkey-puzzle.


Colmáin, G. Ó. (2016). Turkey’s new role: From NATO lapdog to Emerging Empire. Home/News/APA.

Engdahl, W.F. (2016). Top USA National security officials admit Turkey coup.


Funk, N. C. (2009). Peacemaking between America and the Muslim World: A New Beginning? Insight Turkey11.4 131-150.

Grigoriadis, I. N. (2010). Friends no more? The rise of anti-American nationalism in Turkey. The Middle East Journal, 64,151-66.

Grove, A., & Carter, N. (1999). Not All Blarney Is Cast in Stone: International Cultural Conflict 
in Northern Ireland. Political Psychology, 20.(4), 725-765. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3792193.

Gunter, M. M. (2005). The U.S-Turkish alliance in disarray. World Affairs, 167(3), 113-123. 

Gunter, M. M. (2011). Five Stages of American Foreign Policy towards the Kurds. Insight Turkey. 13. (2), 93-106. 

Hale, W. (2009). Turkey and the Middle East in the 'New Era.’
Insight Turkey, 11. (3), p 143-159. 

Harun Y. (2016). Pakistan News diplomatic and global issues. Retrieved from www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_id_24.pdf.


Howard, M. in Sulaimaniya, Iraq and Goldenberg, S. Washington (2003).


Iltebir, E. (2015). Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Orientation. Athreat to the West? Ann Arbor, MI: ProQuest LLC.

Kakizaki, M. (2012). American Image in Turkey: U.S. Foreign Policy Dimensions
Insight Turkey. 14. (1), 183-185. 

Kanat, K. B. (2012). America's Asia-Pacific Strategy and Turkish-American Partnership
 Insight Turkey14.2 157-175. 

Kirici, K. (2009). Turkey’s "Demonstrative Effect" and the Transformation of the Middle East Insight Turkey. 13. (2), 33-55.

Kirici, K. (2013). Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 15. (2), p189 -205, p17. 

Önis, Z. (Spring 2005). The Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity? The Middle East Journal, 59(2), 265-284. 

Ozel, S. (2012). Indispensable even when unreliable. International Journal, 67(1), 53-64. 

Park, B. (2013). Turkey’s Isolated Stance: An  Ally no more. International Affairs 91, (3), 582-600

Sayari, S (2013). New directions in Turkey-USA relations. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies; 15 (2), p129-142.

Schmitt, E. (1992). U.S. Missiles Hit Turkish Ship, Killing 5. 

Tbatou, K.; and Yackley, A. J. (2006). Valley of the Wolves: Iraq Hurriyet. Counterpoise.10. (3), 36-38.

Terry, J. J. (2008). Turkey, the US and Iraq/Oil and Democracy in Iraq
Arab Studies Quarterly, 30.(1), 71-74. 

The Guardian (2011). US arrest of soldiers infuriates Turkey.

Unknown author (2010). New York Times, 159. (54962), p 4.


Unknown author (2016). Turks Can Agree on One Thing: U.S. Was Behind Failed Coup. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/.../turkey-coup-erdogan-fethullah-gulen-united

Ustun and Kanat (2013). Mediterranean Quarterly

Von Papen, F. (2016). Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia, 6th Edition, 1. Retrieved from 



Warner, G. (2009). The United States and the Cyprus crisis of 1974. International Affairs, 85(1), 129-143. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00785.

World Public Opinion.org Public Opinion Divided in Turkey | Pew Research Retrieved from www.pewglobal.org/.../turkey-report-15 www.pewglobal.org.


Topics: ,